Boeing 737 MAX

[ssobol]

At least on the 737NGs, AOA is an option. The system has it anyway and it can be displayed to the pilot on the PFD. However, it is the airlines not Boeing who choose not to enable it (it is a simple aircraft display option selection). Only a few use it, I believe AA is one.

It would be the same for any Boeing aircraft that uses the Boeing CDS system for the cockpit displays.

FWIW, most business jets have AOA displays and have had them for a long time.

However, thinking about this further, if the aircraft is flying badly due to a faulty AOA sensor, presenting this faulty information to the pilot probably won't help things much.

 

[Delfin]

https://www-m.cnn.com/2019/03/13/us...ing-737-max/index.html?r=https://www.cnn.com/

Can’t blame pilots if it isn’t in the flight manual.

That is still false. It was in the flight manual from the beginning, just not called current nomenclature of MCAS. Perhaps read the wiki you posted and note that the Lion Air pilots were unfamiliar with the basic checklists every 737 pilot of expected to know, and that the Lion Air mechanics were replacing sensors the day before the flight. The claim that this is Boeing's responsibility is put forward by lawyers looking for the deepest pocket to go after, and should be given as much credence as one of Michael Avenatti's allegations.

 

[Delfin]

A lot of aircraft have uncommanded inputs or unusual emergencies during their growth.


The second type USCG helo I flew would sometimes reduce lift to zero while descending under 100 feet while making a approaches to the water at night. Talk about eye openers....but we didn't crash any.


Pilots that fly new aircraft or modded should understand more than the minimum training requirements.

Or perhaps one way to put it is that each air frame has unique flight characteristics that pilots have to master. My TB-21 could be landed smoothly on short runways. Put me in a Mooney and I'd need 5,000 feet to get it on the ground because I'm not used to the different way that frame handles ground effect. Blaming Mooney if I run off the runway would be unfair.

These aren't Greyhound buses.

 

[ssobol]

... Blaming Mooney if I run off the runway would be unfair. ....

But is likely to happen by the pilot (or his/her heirs) or anyone else injured in the resulting accident.

 

[Delfin]

But is likely to happen by the pilot (or his/her heirs) or anyone else injured in the resulting accident.

Which is why planes cost 2x what that should.

The most perverse example of this is the new Icon. It is so easy to fly, pilot's, including experienced ones, are tempted to make poor decisions in flight that have cost lives.

https://www.aviationlawmonitor.com/2018/01/articles/general-aviation/family-sues-icon-for-fatal-a5-crash/

 

[Woodland Hills]

I cannot believe that the FAA allowed Boeing to certify this aircraft as a modified 737 and not as a new aircraft. The wing was moved several feet to accommodate the new engines changing the flight characteristics and yet they were permitted to avoid the costly full certification flight test program: WHY?

It is now obvious that there is a significant flaw in this design, one that Boeing was aware of, witness the band-aid they used to “fix” the problem and one that they would have been required to address on a more fundamental level had their been a full certification flight test program instead of the truncated one mandated for modifications to certificated designs.

Is this a case of regulatory capture wherein the revolving door allows Boeing to dictate to their regulator, the FAA, what they want and the agency finds a way to make that happen? If not, why is the US practically the only nation that has failed to ground the 737 MAX fleet? Or has the FAA again prioritized the “promote aviation” portion of their mission statement over the safety part.

UPDATE: President overrules FAA and grounds all 737 MAX 6 and 8’s.

 

[psneeld]

Maybe the FAA is more on top of it and not "guessing"....

 

[Screaming04]

Grounded. Enough said.

 

[BruceK]

Grounded. Enough said.

Not sure about that. Some posters are adamant the cause is pilot error/lack of pilot training/pilot stupidity and the planes have had the system since 737 inception. I expect they take strong issue with the POTUS decision to ground the aircraft, which he says has airline agreement.Canada fell in line with grounding.
I`m reading the system giving trouble is a "fix" to correct a handling peculiarity of the aircraft which may now be corrected by a further "fix". But if the crashes are due to pilot incompetence, grounding and talk of further "fix" is unnecessary,and Govts.and aviation authorities around the world have got this completely wrong.
Fortunately our forthcoming flights are B787 and A350. Though on the A350 personal items placed on the windowsill can be lost into a gap.

 

[AlaskaProf]

Some posters are adamant the cause is pilot error/lack of pilot training/pilot stupidity and the planes have had the system since 737 inception.

I'm probably in the group you refer to, though I don't have enough info to be adamant about anything, but:


I am inclined to suspect that we are looking not at "pilot error or stupidity", but at the effect of superimposing 21st Century technology on 19th Century management systems. Strangely, that seems to be what the President was trying to say when he whined about Einstein the Pilot.


Both of these carriers have been on the ICAO "sh*t" list in recent memory for training and management issues. Excerpt below from a longer message from a guy who is in the compliance business:

Boeing regulatory affairs representatives worked with the Indonesian Civil Aviation Authority in regaining FAA International Aviation Safety Assessments (IASA) Category 1 status. Similarly Boeing recently supported Ethiopia in its attempt to maintain a FAA IASA Category 1 rating. In other words both countires failed to meet the very basic ICAO Annex operational and airworthiness standards. And were FAA IASA Cat 2 countries (IAW litle or no aviation safety regulations.)

A few years ago an ICAO Safety Audit of the Ethiopian civil aviation system found in a 141 page report in part, that...

- Ethiopia Civil Aviation Authority has not developed and promulgated operating regulations that are in conformance with the provisions of ICAO Annex 6. In practice, various Annex 6 provisions are being implemented; however, there is no technical directive or regulation requiring such implementation. The Ethiopian regulations do not include, among other requirements, the following:
...
c) flight manuals revisions and parameters of flight data recorders;
d) implementation of a system for providing flight information to operations staff and flight crew;
e) aircraft certification and operating limitations;
f) required training for flight operations officers;
...

- The Flight Operations Division of the ECAA has not developed a formal surveillance inspection programme that includes all the types and frequency of inspections required for proper oversight of air operator certificate (AOC) holders. There is no surveillance of station facilities or oversight of all the designated pilot examiners authorized to perform examinations on behalf of the ECAA. In addition, there is no surveillance over cabin crew instructors and examiners, and no comprehensive surveillance over flight crew and cabin crew duty and rest periods.

-The ECAA has not established a procedure to gather sufficient evidence to demonstrate that a flight crew member has not performed his/her duties in accordance with the prescribed procedures, as personnel licensing inspectors do not review the reports of flight examinations performed by designated pilot examiners.

-The ECAA system for the certification of aviation training organizations, including a system for ensuring the qualification and competency of the instructors in all aviation training
organizations...is not comprehensive and does not conform with the provisions of Annex 1, Appendix 2. In addition, the ECAA has not established an effective surveillance programme to ensure continuing regulatory compliance by approved training organizations.

​

The message is much longer, but I think this gives the flavor. Add to this the 200 hour "co-pilot", the ground staff who dispatched the airplane at least six times with a failed AOA sensor, and the flightcrew who made the same ineffectual response 25 times, and I understand why FAA was not in a hurry to blame the flight control system.


I am curious about the report of "new evidence" discovered at the Ethiopia site.
​

 

[Delfin]

Not sure about that. Some posters are adamant the cause is pilot error/lack of pilot training/pilot stupidity and the planes have had the system since 737 inception. I expect they take strong issue with the POTUS decision to ground the aircraft, which he says has airline agreement.Canada fell in line with grounding.
I`m reading the system giving trouble is a "fix" to correct a handling peculiarity of the aircraft which may now be corrected by a further "fix". But if the crashes are due to pilot incompetence, grounding and talk of further "fix" is unnecessary,and Govts.and aviation authorities around the world have got this completely wrong.
Fortunately our forthcoming flights are B787 and A350. Though on the A350 personal items placed on the windowsill can be lost into a gap.

Calling the MCAS system a "fix to correct a handling peculiarity" is a bit like saying deicing boots are just such a "fix".

Lion Air has one of the worst safety records on the planet, and when I think of the kind of infra structure needed for technological competence the first word that does not spring to mind is Ethiopia, even though the safety record for Ethiopian Air is very good.

The planes are grounded because people are freaked out because two planes piloted by third world pilots crashed, because of uninformed nonsense on the Internet, and in part likely because of poor training in a new aircraft that is marketed as nearly identical to the older 737, which it kind of is, and kind of not. Better training will likely cure the problem, but it would be a good idea to wait on the crash reports that I suspect will come very quickly now that the fleet is on the ground.

Want to know who agrees with this opinion? The stock market. Boeing stock was up today.

 

[Flybull]

A lot of aircraft have uncommanded inputs or unusual emergencies during their growth.


The second type USCG helo I flew would sometimes reduce lift to zero while descending under 100 feet while making a approaches to the water at night. Talk about eye openers....but we didn't crash any.


Pilots that fly new aircraft or modded should understand more than the minimum training requirements.

Could you expound on this a little bit?

 

[ssobol]

I cannot believe that the FAA allowed Boeing to certify this aircraft as a modified 737 and not as a new aircraft. The wing was moved several feet to accommodate the new engines changing the flight characteristics and yet they were permitted to avoid the costly full certification flight test program: WHY?

...

How do you tell that the "wing was moved several feet"? In relation to what, the nose, the tail, landing gear? There are many aircraft that have different physical dimensions but are still essentially the same airplane with the same type rating. These include ATRs, 737 Classics, 737NGs, 777s, 757s, 767s, A320s, A340s, A330s, MD80s, 727s, the list goes on. The 747-200 and the 747SP differed in overall length by around 50 feet, but were pretty much the same aircraft.

That said, there is still a valid point in that the FAA does not have the staff or expertise to effectively and extensively evaluate each and every design that aircraft manufacturers come up with. The FAA relies heavily on the manufacturers to explain and justify their designs. If the argument is convincing enough, the FAA accepts what the manufacturer tells them. But the FAA also relies on a lot of non-FAA personnel to carry out the regulatory functions that the FAA is responsible for (e.g. Designated Examiners).

 

[Civilitas]

How do you tell that the "wing was moved several feet"? In relation to what, the nose, the tail, landing gear?

I don't know about any wing relocation; the kludge that has a lot of engineers vexed is the engine movement in relation to the wing. To accommodate the high-bypass engines necessary to get the fuel efficiency competitive, the engines had to be slung forward and up to fit them to the airframe. This creates the inherent handling defects that the MCAS is designed to correct.

Take a look at these comparative pics of the original low-bypass JT8s the plane was designed for, and the CFM-LEAP that are fitted now. This is what, as I understand it, is the root of the alleged problem.

 

[psneeld]

Calling the MCAS system a "fix to correct a handling peculiarity" is a bit like saying deicing boots are just such a "fix".

Lion Air has one of the worst safety records on the planet, and when I think of the kind of infra structure needed for technological competence the first word that does not spring to mind is Ethiopia, even though the safety record for Ethiopian Air is very good.

The planes are grounded because people are freaked out because two planes piloted by third world pilots crashed, because of uninformed nonsense on the Internet, and in part likely because of poor training in a new aircraft that is marketed as nearly identical to the older 737, which it kind of is, and kind of not. Better training will likely cure the problem, but it would be a good idea to wait on the crash reports that I suspect will come very quickly now that the fleet is on the ground.

Want to know who agrees with this opinion? The stock market. Boeing stock was up today.

I agree.....

 

[psneeld]

Could you expound on this a little bit?

In the early days, the RADAR altimeters would lose tracking and cycle.


When flyinge hands off approaches to a hover, the autopilot system would see the RADALT cycle to max altitude, think the helo was too high and bottom the collective.(reduce lift to zero).



In daytime at 75 or so feet, it was scary, at night it almost made you want to give up flying. It took almost a ear or so till the worked it out.



No grounding there...

 

[FF]

"I am curious about the report of "new evidence" discovered at the Ethiopia site"

The claim is the sat track of both crashed aircraft is similar.

 

[Seevee]

Seems like there's two major things that standout with this plane.

1. The philosophy that the airplane is smarter than the pilots so let's design a system that will protect the pilot if he screws up.

2. The proper training for emergency situations that require the correct action and that it be accomplished timely.

After 25000 hour in the air, I'm beginning to figure this out.

And to add one more thing......
It's hard to understand why the Lion plane wasn't fixed after the FIRST time is had failed.

 

[Seevee]

In the early days, the RADAR altimeters would lose tracking and cycle.


When flyinge hands off approaches to a hover, the autopilot system would see the RADALT cycle to max altitude, think the helo was too high and bottom the collective.(reduce lift to zero).



In daytime at 75 or so feet, it was scary, at night it almost made you want to give up flying. It took almost a ear or so till the worked it out.



No grounding there...

Yea, wouldn't take a few times of that happening that I'd give up flying and take up boating.....

 

[Delfin]

"I am curious about the report of "new evidence" discovered at the Ethiopia site"

The claim is the sat track of both crashed aircraft is similar.

That wouldn't surprise me. If the reactions of the crews to whatever confused them was the same, the planes are going to react the same.

Pilots do make bad decisions sometimes. Distracted by my flight instructor's need to hop into the back seat to express milk for her new baby while I was pulling the aircraft ouy of the hangar, I neglected to detach the tow bar from the nose wheel. Took off, retracted gear, and flew all the way to Aurora Oregon trying to figure out why my airspeed was a few knots belore what it should have been. Greased the landing in Aurora and on taxi, got a call from another pilot -"Uh, 42 Tango Golf, you aware you have a tow bar attached to the nose gear?"

Based on the internet's reaction to the Boeing crash some would say Socata should be held accountable if I had the tow bar flip up during flight into the prop and cause a crash because "Remove the tow bar before taking off" wasn't in the flight manual. I would say that inattentive pilots should pay attention.

 

[cardude01]

I wish Baker would comment on this thread, but he may not be able to talk about it. I bet he has flown the 737 Max.

 

[sunchaser]

[/I]

I wish Baker would comment on this thread, but he may not be able to talk about it. I bet he has flown the 737 Max.

Lots of 737 Max pilots are talking about this, in the right surroundings. Hardly prudent to do it on TF. As suggested, best to see what the boxes contain.

 

[Seevee]

I wish Baker would comment on this thread, but he may not be able to talk about it. I bet he has flown the 737 Max.

That would be great if he could. I've got quite a bit of time in the earlier models of the 737 and as it evolved the difference became significant and more automation. The Max seems like an entirely different plane.

 

[cardude01]

[emoji106][emoji106][emoji106]

 

[Woodland Hills]

That would be great if he could. I've got quite a bit of time in the earlier models of the 737 and as it evolved the difference became significant and more automation. The Max seems like an entirely different plane.

According to the FAA it is the same plane as in 1968 when it first was certificated.

Would the FAA would issue a type certificate for a clean sheet design that has such undesirable flight characteristics as to need an MCAS to make it airworthy.? If not, why is this acceptable on yet another reworking of a 60 year old design?

The FAA has abrogated is responsibility to ensure safety by allowing Boeing to modify the 737 far beyond its type certification instead of forcing Boeing to pony up the scores of billions of dollars to recertify the newest modification as a new aircraft. Instead they have put the onus upon the flight crew and then decided to not even train them on their band-aid fix. They have also successfully shifted the discussion of responsibility from Boeing to to the pilots: this is so wrong on so many levels.

 

[ssobol]

I don't know about any wing relocation; the kludge that has a lot of engineers vexed is the engine movement in relation to the wing. To accommodate the high-bypass engines necessary to get the fuel efficiency competitive, the engines had to be slung forward and up to fit them to the airframe. This creates the inherent handling defects that the MCAS is designed to correct.

Take a look at these comparative pics of the original low-bypass JT8s the plane was designed for, and the CFM-LEAP that are fitted now. This is what, as I understand it, is the root of the alleged problem.

Actually the engines are moved forward and up because Boeing did not want to change the 737 landing gear and associated structure to provide more ground clearance to hang the larger engines in the original position. Same reason that a lot of 737s have the flattened engine cowl.

... 1. The philosophy that the airplane is smarter than the pilots so let's design a system that will protect the pilot if he screws up

This is one of the main reasons for driverless cars.

 

[FF]

A look at a past problem,


https://imgur.com/a/5wcFx8M

 

[psneeld]

A lot of "forgiveness* to pilots who "didn't have enough time to correct".


What's enough time?... and were they trained for paridigm shifts?

 

[Boat]

I wish Baker would comment on this thread, but he may not be able to talk about it. I bet he has flown the 737 Max.

Too busy, bet all the Max pilots are in "training".

, because of uninformed nonsense on the Internet,

Mob rule and mass hysteria, some call it civilization. Welcome to the future. Grounding the planes is probably of little value, feel good, kumbaya moment.


I bet Boeing didn't want to appear concerned and asked "The Scapegoat in Chief" to call the shot.

 

[BruceK]

Maybe Boeing`s insurers had a hand in Boeing supporting the grounding. Past Comet and DC10 issues come to mind. I`m sure, given time, Boeing will remedy the situation.
Perhaps it`s a combination of design and pilots, but it would be a courtesy not to tip a bucket of excrement over the pilots pending clarification of the issue.I`m not inclined to accept,without more information, that a Captain with 8000 hours amassed that service time drinking coffee and on social media, while the planes flew themselves.