One of the major delays in the A380 program-- I believe it was nearly a year if not more--- was caused by Franco-German animosity. The French decided to use Dassault's computer design program CATIA for their A380 design work. (We use CATIA, too, here at Boeing). The Germans, however, refused, saying they were going to stick with their older system called (IIRC) Intergraph.
Try as they might, neither side was able to get the other one to give in and change.
So the Germans did their design work with Intergraph and the French did theirs with CATIA.
The Germans designed a lot of the wiring for the plane and many if not all of the huge and long wiring bundles were manufactured in Germany to the Intergraph specs.
As it was explained to me at the time, Integraph and CATIA were not very compatible. So you know what's coming next, right?
When the planes began final assembly in Touluse, France, the wiring harnesses and bundles from Germany didn't fit the plane because the structural data imported from CATIA did not translate correctly into the Integraph system. So many of these complex and very long wiring bundles and harnesses turned out to be too short and they wouldn't connect up or even fit the structure properly.
The first planes ended up having their wiring "designed", created, and installed on the spot, plane by plane, in Toulouse, a staggeringly time-consuming and expensive process. Meanwhile a good part of the planes wiring system was redesigned to match the actual plane. Which meant that the wiring manufacturing all had to be totally reworked.
An airplane is an ongoing search for solutions. Not just when they're new, but even after they've been in service for years as witness the overwing slide raft door issue I described in John's TMOH thread. Sometimes the problems turn up as a result of the passage of time. Sometimes they turn out to be operator error. Sometimes they turn out to be a less than optimal design in the first place.
The 787's battery issue, as dramatic as its arrival might have been, will probably have less of an impact on the overall schedule of the plane than the penalty of the Franco-German tussle over the A380s design process had on theirs.
But nobody on either side of the Atlantic just wrings their hands, feels sorry for themselves, gives up and goes home. We (the industry) keep working the problems until solutions are found. Sure it can be very expensive. But I once read a great explanation of the whole commercial airplane industy by some really prominent person in it whose name I've forgotten. The title of his article was "Sex and Bananas. Why the Aviation Industry Soldiers On." Don't know if I'm remembering the last phrase correctly but the sex and bananas part is right.
His point about sex is that it's a sexy industry and that's what attracts and keeps people in it. It's a sexy business to be in, flying and making planes. So much so that being in it is actually more important than making money at it. Which is why the airframe manufacturing and airline companies suck as investments. The primary objective, deep down below the surfacy things like stockholders and such, is to be involved in flight. No matter what the cost.
I could list example after example of times I'm aware of when major decisions had to be made about a Boeing plane. The choices were to make the plane better or leave things "good enough" and make more money. And of all the examples I know of--- from the B-17 and B-29 through the 707, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, and 77--- the decision ALWAYS came down on the side of making the plane better even if it meant "losing" a ton of money in the process. Because in the end, it's all about the plane.
CEO's and CFOs have been over-ridden time and time again by our engineers and sometimes, like the case of Tex Johnson and the major problem with the 707, the pilots. The execs fight and bitch and complain and replace program directors but in the end, the plane always wins. It's a sexy industry.
I have no clue how the battery issue will be resolved. We have people in our department directly supporing the work and I hear bits and pieces from them. But regardless of what one thinks the corporate executives' responsibility should be in this case or if some other decision about the plane's battery power should have been made during the design phase, the important thing as far as I'm concerned is that where the rubber meets the road--- the folks who are working 24/7 to define the problem, conceive and design a solution, and eliminate the problem---- are sparing no effort or expense.
Based on how I've seen these folks tackle equally tough or tougher problems on the planes we've introduced since I've been here, it's a cool thing to be associated with because at this hands-on level, these people---- like SomeSailor and his fellow engineers---- are very, very smart and very, very determined to find the solution.
The bananas part of the article was the author's analogy for the way the airlines schedule flights and charge for seats.
