FAA grounds 787

[FF]

"This is sound technology that is growing through rigors of the real world."

No doubt,,, but the real question is how long can Boeing wait for the tech to be useable?

Hate to think they would be so stubborn that they will keep cranking out 5 a month 787's for the next 3 -5 YEARS ,
waiting for the tech to catch up.

Will they continue to ramp up production towards 15 or 20 a month , during the wait?

 

[SomeSailor]

No doubt,,, but the real question is how long can Boeing wait for the tech to be useable?

The engineering solution has likely been defined. It's now got to get through the rigors of test, qualification and certification.

Hate to think they would be so stubborn that they will keep cranking out 5 a month 787's for the next 3 -5 YEARS ,
waiting for the tech to catch up.

I haven't heard anything about "waiting for technology to catch up". There are hundreds... thousands of planes to be built and that has nothing to do with what sort of battery technology they carry. Boeing has approval to build and fly 787's. They are being built faster than ever.

 

[Underway]

Then the rest would likely know this is a Thales design.

Are you saying that Thales peviously obtained design approval for the battery from the DGAC/FAA and that Boeing purchased the batteries as an off-the-shelf unit?

 

[SomeSailor]

I don't know the particulars of the contracts portion of these, but the inverters are Thales design, the batteries themselves from Yuasa and the chargers / thermal regulators from an outfit in Arizona.

It's be just the same for an engine problem. We wouldn't stop production for an AD on the engines either. Just another hurdle.

 

[BruceK]

All you aircraft experts, anyone seen news reports of a door (in business class) coming open about 4 inches on an A380 flying between BKK and HKG, cabin crew stuffing the gap with blankets and pillows secured with duct tape, scared passengers complaining of extreme cold and loud noise until reaching destination? The operators are reported as admitting to noise, but say it is impossible for the door to open.

 

[Underway]

I don't know the particulars of the contracts portion of these, but the inverters are Thales design, the batteries themselves from Yuasa and the chargers / thermal regulators from an outfit in Arizona.

It's be just the same for an engine problem. We wouldn't stop production for an AD on the engines either. Just another hurdle.

The question was about design responisbility, not production. Very big difference from the engines, which have their own type certificate. If the batteries are not already approved under a process separate from the airframe....BOEING is 100% responsible for the design under the airplane type certificate...doesn't matter who is doing the work under contract. Implying that Thales is responsible would simply be wrong...and misleading.

 

[SomeSailor]

That was just a door seal that was leaking. The door never actually came open, or was in danger of opening. Just a troublesome cold air leak.

 

[Underway]

Boeing has approval to build and fly 787's.

Not exactly.

 

[SomeSailor]

The question was about design responisbility, not production.

Perhaps you should ask the question as you want it answered then.

I'm not implying that Boeing is not responsible for the overall design. Just that Thales is the sub for all of the backup power generation systems and hence the designer of those systems. They have their own DEs, their own ARs and their own certification under Part 145 for those systems. They are working under Boeing's TC, but they most certainly are responsible for their system, and it's airworthiness.

You seem to know something about what you're talking about, so if you want specific answers, ask specific questions.

 

[SomeSailor]

Not exactly.

Say what you think you mean then.

Do we not still hold the valid Production Cert? Have they pulled the Type Cert? Have we stopped production? Are we going to keep flying B1s?

What EXACTLY are you asking?

 

[Underway]

[/I]
Perhaps you should ask the question as you want it answered then.

I'm not implying that Boeing is not responsible for the overall design. Just that Thales is the sub for all of the backup power generation systems and hence the designer of those systems. They have their own DEs, their own ARs and their own certification under Part 145 for those systems. They are working under Boeing's TC, but they most certainly are responsible for their system, and it's airworthiness.

You seem to know something about what you're talking about, so if you want specific answers, ask specific questions.

The question was specific and in regard to design approval and responsibility. You introduced production.

As you stated in the first sentence, second paragraph above, Boeing is responsible for the type design, including the batteries. End of story.

Part 145 covers Repair Stations, not type certification.

 

[Underway]

Say what you think you mean then.

Do we not still hold the valid Production Cert? Have they pulled the Type Cert? Have we stopped production? Are we going to keep flying B1s?

What EXACTLY are you asking?

You currently have a very constricted Airworthiness Certificate which covers flight test only. The validity of the Production and Type Certificates is over shadowed by the grounding action. Surely you're not saying the aircraft currently on the production line won't be modified by a change to the Type Design before they enter airline service. And if the aircraft on the production line are knowingly being built to a Type Design with a dangerous flaw, then the Production Certificate is in reality, invalid. The Feds left the TC and PC intact to allow you to move forward for economic and public perception reasons. Technically, both are invalid and could be pulled.

 

[SomeSailor]

The question was specific and in regard to design approval and responsibility. You introduced production.

Yes I did. Boeing has overall design approval for the TYPE CERT of the 787, Thales is the designer of the inverter. They are a supplier like any other. They certify, qualify, conform and test their LRU like any other on the aircraft.

 

[SomeSailor]

You currently have a very constricted Airworthiness Certificate which covers flight test only.

Including those B1s as required. (Production Flight Tests and Ferry Flights)

And if the aircraft on the production line are knowingly being built to a Type Design with a dangerous flaw, then the Production Certificate is in reality, invalid. The Feds left the TC and PC intact to allow you to move forward for economic and public perception reasons. Technically, both are invalid and could be pulled.

The production cert is in no jeopardy and certainly not invalid. You can manufacture airplanes all day long and the only risk would re-work should you change the design before delivery (economic risk). We built better than 50 787 aircraft before we received initial Type Cert. This is no different.

You seem to have a very adversarial position on this and I'd rather talk about boats, so I'll make this my last comment to you on this matter.

 

[Underway]

Yes I did. Boeing has overall design approval for the TYPE CERT of the 787, Thales is the designer of the inverter. They are a supplier like any other. They certify, qualify, conform and test their LRU like any other on the aircraft.

Do you mean to say that Thales, for example, designs, certifies, tests, and conforms completely independent of Boeing oversight?

 

[Underway]

Including those B1s as required. (Production Flight Tests and Ferry Flights)



The production cert is in no jeopardy and certainly not invalid. You can manufacture airplanes all day long and the only risk would re-work should you change the design before delivery (economic risk). We built better than 50 787 aircraft before we received initial Type Cert. This is no different.

You seem to have a very adversarial position on this and I'd rather talk about boats, so I'll make this my last comment to you on this matter.

Just separating fact from Boeing PR. By the way, name calling is a little sophomoric, don't you think?

 

[Underway]

Including those B1s as required. (Production Flight Tests and Ferry Flights)



The production cert is in no jeopardy and certainly not invalid. You can manufacture airplanes all day long and the only risk would re-work should you change the design before delivery (economic risk). We built better than 50 787 aircraft before we received initial Type Cert. This is no different.

You seem to have a very adversarial position on this and I'd rather talk about boats, so I'll make this my last comment to you on this matter.

As I said, the airworthiness certificate is severely restricted...including allowable operating area.

Production prior to TC is sometimes allowed when the data package is missing substantiating data...most often flight test results. It would be most unusual for it to be permitted at the front end of a program when a known serious safety related item is part of the TC drawing package. This is different.

 

[sunchaser]

Lots of details are coming out on the 787 battery issues. In a WSJ interview wth CEO McNerney he was quoted as saying he'd contacted fellow CEOs at GM and GE soliciting help from their Li battery gurus. He did not say he'd contacted Ford's CEO Mullahy (is this correct - who'd left Boeing when denied the top job McNerney received?)

The FAA is yet to sign off on Boeing's new plans to:

1. Put a beefier fireproof box around the batteries
2. Increase the space between the batteries
3. Put smoke tubes leading from the beefier box to vent to the outside in the event (certainty?) of fire

Now Congress is getting ready to convene on the myriad of regulatory issues that are involved. Good news is needed.

 

[Marin]

There are only two batteries on the plane. The "space between them" is not being changed. One is in the front of the plane, one is in the back. The additional space is in the form of changes to the internal layout and construction of the batteries themselves.

Your assumption about Mulally, who I happen to know quite well, is also incorrect.

Ignorance continues to run rampant.

 

[Moonstruck]

It's a 28V battery... not a solid fuel rocket booster.

I would never belittle the catastrophe that befell the crew of the Challenger, but the batteries in this application have the possibility of killing far more people. A few pounds and dollars saved is no excuse for bypassing good safety practices.

 

[sunchaser]

Ignorance you say Marin, maybe but the facts are well known in the business world. Condit and Stonecipher left Boeing as CEOs in some degree of disgrace with Mulally (well thought of internally and the right creds) the apparent correct internal candidate. McNerney had been passed over at GE to eventually land at Boeing - a financial guy lacking an engineering background. Seven years ago, in comes McNerney and out goes Mulally.

The question is - did McNerney call Mulally for Li battery help as he did the CEOs of GE and GM?

 

[Marin]

Seven years ago, in comes McNerney and out goes Mulally.

Sorry dude, but your "well known facts" about Mulally's move to Ford could not be more wrong. I happen to know why he made the change because he told me.

Continue to believe your "business world" sources if you like. In this case, I know they are every bit as clueless as you continue to be.

 

[FF]

MY GUESS is Boeing will use batteries made just slightly differently.

Thicker insulation in the cells to stop the dendrites from shorting out the cell , and starting the melt down/fires.

Maybe an extra pound of insulation , shouldn't hurt the range much.

 

[SomeSailor]

Don't get the terminology wrong though. Dendrites are fibrous crystals that form IN the cell. The solution that Boeing is proposing involves a better separation of the cells and a ceramic insulator between the eight cells in the inverter. The design of the battery itself remains the same. There is reportedly a redesign of the inverter case to better contain the heat and gases in the event of a failure as well.

 

[sunchaser]

The recent FAA/NTSB reports do not look helpful for quick resolution of the 787 Li battery/system failures. They are talking about "hearings " scheduled for next month, uh oh. Hopefully there is someone in Boeing with suitable clout that will get this issue beyond the forest vs trees and out of the clutches of the regulators. Tick tock ------------

 

[jukesy]

Isn't this the reason the new fleet of boeing's have been grounded???

Just say'n

 

[Northern Spy]

Isn't this the reason the new fleet of boeing's have been grounded???

Just say'n

You should start a thread on that.

 

[Marin]

Isn't this the reason the new fleet of boeing's have been grounded???

Just say'n

The issue was with the Yuasa battery used in the 787, not with Lithium Ion batteries in general.

 

[O C Diver]

We've taken these things all over the world for years and never had a problem with them at all. They need to be designed correctly, they need to be made correctly, and they need to be controlled correctly but this notion that there's some sort of evil bugaboo about Lithium Ion batteries is uninformed at best and ignorant at worst.

Marin you need to do some research before posting stuff like this.

99% of the Lithium Ion batteries in the world are smaller than a "D" size battery and pose very little risk. However, when you get to the larger sizes, high energy density models, and battery pack made of dozens to hundreds of cells, the failure rate and fire risk is very significant. An internal short of a cell that isn't even connected to a charging device can start a fire in some cases.

I'm sure you have seen this: Boeing 787 Lithium Battery Fire

Article covers some of the elevated risks of Lithium Batteries.

Ted

 

[SomeSailor]

Marin you need to do some research before posting stuff like this.

99% of the Lithium Ion batteries in the world are smaller than a "D" size battery and pose very little risk.

That's contrary to the likelihood that Lithium Ion batteries were the root cause behind the loss of UPS6 in Dubai a few years back.

Lithium Ion battery thermal runaways are a very real possibility, but with the right protection and monitoring in place they can be safely implemented (and contained in an event)