Navy Destroyer tee boned by a Freighter?

[Wxx3]

Nope, all those relieved might as well retire or get out.

One of the most senior and revered Captains in the USCG reviewed my files when I was passed over for promotion to Captain. His comment was never before had he seen a file like that (without one negative comment and many awards) get a person passed over. He said I must have pissed off the wrong guy...heck, I know I piss off plenty. But a major error like a collision in todays military, if you dont get slammed, or jail time, good assignments are only a dream.

There is a great thread over on gCaptain about Chief Mates that you all may like.

Yes, the 1980's
After I got my weather detachment to have the best forecast skill scores in Alaska, while supporting:
a SAC Recce wing that only flew NCA directed missions,
The Alaskan Tanker Task Force and a
TAC fighter wing,

I was told by my CO (who was at a different location and not related to the units that I supported) that, "I was too hard on my men, but that I'd be great in wartime"

My response, "I must not have understood my mission"

The military changed significantly in the 80's and has essentially filled up with leadership whose priorities are diametrically opposed to what they were inn WW2.
The "mission" is now on last place.

Which goes a long way in explaining how we have managed to spend so much time, money and lives ib the Middle East only to end up where we started.

 

[Gordon J]

Doubtful

There is nothing firm that these commanders won't be allowed to operate other ships in the future. They were just removed from the Fitzgerald. More administrative than anything since the ship won't be operating anytime soon and they no longer were on duty. Further decisions will come after the completion of the investigation. They haven't been stripped of rank or discharged.

After retiring from the military i have seen this all too often. The commander I'd responsible for everything his subordinates do, or fail to do. As a company commander i would be held responsible for soldiers getting DUIs.

Three guys are toast as far as their careers are concerned. They will not be promoted and will not be put in charge of anything but a desk until they resign. The navy doesn't care about responsibility as much as it cares about setting an example. You can bet every skipper in the navy reviews procedures with his our her crew weekly.

The navy has no shortage of people able to lead.

 

[psneeld]

In the USCG , I was told you would be terminated if you got a DUI as an officer....even just before retirement.

That meant 19 plus years of dedicated and decorated service would end with no vesting in anything. Out on your butt with nada.

For a senior officer, that was a penalty equal to a several million dollar annuity paying a long retirement. A lot harsher than some of my civilian friends who hardly saw a blip in their careers.

 

[BandB]

In the USCG , I was told you would be terminated if you got a DUI as an officer....even just before retirement.

That meant 19 plus years of dedicated and decorated service would end with no vesting in anything. Out on your butt with nada.

For a senior officer, that was a penalty equal to a several million dollar annuity paying a long retirement. A lot harsher than some of my civilian friends who hardly saw a blip in their careers.

I have known that to be the case too. I have a basic problem with today's action erasing previous work. Businesses did the same and it was not unusual for businesses to terminate employees just short of vesting in their retirement. That's why US Code 1053, part of Erisa, established minimum vesting requirements. Depending on the plan you must vest either two years behind or three years behind and you must be fully vested by 6 or 7 years. This is not just in your contribution, but also employer contribution.

Sadly, we pass laws to protect private citizens but not to protect our military. Also, many ERISA and other employment laws don't apply to city or state employees, including teachers (back to laws protecting states' rights).

I just have a serious problem with taking away earned benefits based on a single event and a problem with a retirement system that requires 20 years to become vested.

 

[Blissboat]

From this morning's U.S. Naval Institute news:

https://news.usni.org/2017/08/17/vc...arly-investigation-results-punishments-coming

The article includes this graphic showing the angle of incidence at the moment of collision, which was fine on the destroyer's starboard quarter:

https://news.usni.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/fitz_col.png

That portrayal was news to me. Narrative accounts of the event suggested a more nearly square angle, close to broad on the starboard beam.

There is no excuse for this collision to have happened, period. Indeed, all collisions are, strictly speaking, avoidable. Still, I begin to appreciate the visual issues that contributed. The destroyer USS Fitzgerald, operating at night, was likely displaying only a port and starboard running light, range light, masthead light, and stern light. From the bridge of the overtaking merchie, it's possible that the only lights on the Fitzgerald that would / should have been visible were the stern light and masthead. From the overtaking vessel, neither the destroyer's red nor its green running lights would have been visible. Obviously, the watch officer aboard the merchie failed to comprehend an overtaking situation. There is still no excuse whatsoever for what happened, but I begin to dimly get it.

Of course, this begs the question of what the watch standers aboard Fitzgerald were doing while their vessel was being overtaken. The last few times time I was on the bridge of an Arleigh Burke class DDG, it appeared to have been fitted out with a pretty damn impressive suite of electronic navigation technology. And even if it wasn't, or even if none of it was in working condition - lookouts, gentlemen?

 

[TONTOROSS]

In the USCG , I was told you would be terminated if you got a DUI as an officer....even just before retirement.

That meant 19 plus years of dedicated and decorated service would end with no vesting in anything. Out on your butt with nada.

For a senior officer, that was a penalty equal to a several million dollar annuity paying a long retirement. A lot harsher than some of my civilian friends who hardly saw a blip in their careers.

You betch'a. After Vietnam, the Army was throwing NCO'S and O3'S, 4S' to the trash can. Obama's administration did the same thing during "force reduction" Several Senior NCO'S, that received serious wounds while in Vietnam were forced out due to medical reason's. Each had over 17yos. They got nothing. To this day it pisses me off. Good combat officer's were "RIFD" with the trash to take over where they were outed. Makes no sense. Some Remington Ranger pulling the shots. There I've had my said my 2 cents.

 

[cappy208]

@Blissboat: Without knowing the Fitzgerald speed it would be difficult to determine crossing versus overtaking. I read the report twice. The fitz speed was never stated.

But either way the Fitzgerald had much more capabilities as far as CIC and electronics go. The fitz may have had the electronic edge. But it appears no one observed Colregs.

And the correct lights displayed on the Fitz would be red, green, two masthead lights ( one forward and the other aft and higher ) and the stern light. Coming up from astern the only light visible should have been a stern light. But I doubt this was the aspect the incident started out from.

 

[HiDHo]

Guru

psneeld's Avatar

City: Avalon, NJ
Country: USA
Vessel Name: Freedom
Vessel Model: Albin 40


The concept of senior enlisted was emasculated during the 1980s with touchy feely leadership...at that point, what the heck, a LTJG could administer extra military instruction as well as a chief. Chiefs were suppised to be able to correct minor stuff before it got to "O" country. Not in todays wimpy world.


I retired 10/82 as the "wimpy world" in the Navy and the CMC assignments to the ships I had duty on was taking place. IMO the CMC role destroyed the chain of command instead of enhancing it. It will be interesting to see what specific charges are placed in the record of the Fitzgerald's CMC. For instance is he responcible for the negligence of the lookouts on duty that night ? If so that could extend to any of the enlisted on the mid-watch. I guess the legal folks will have to see if article 92 of the UMCJ applies or will the Navy just get rid of the problem. IMO loss of shipmates lives plus the half billion estimated damage requires some body to be held responcible.

 

[Steve Jackson]

It is still interesting to me to note the simulations of the collision that have been shown. It still looks like the container ship was overtaking the DDG. If in fact that is the case, and the pictures of the damage show that all the damage to the container ship was on the port bow, then it should have been deemed an overtaking situation. If I read the Colregs, Rule 13c "When a vessel is in ANY doubt as to whether she is overtaking another, she (the container ship in this case) shall assume that it does exist and act accordingly" It will still be interesting to see the final outcome, and I don't think we will see that for many years to come.

 

[Wxx3]

You betch'a. After Vietnam, the Army was throwing NCO'S and O3'S, 4S' to the trash can. Obama's administration did the same thing during "force reduction" Several Senior NCO'S, that received serious wounds while in Vietnam were forced out due to medical reason's. Each had over 17yos. They got nothing. To this day it pisses me off. Good combat officer's were "RIFD" with the trash to take over where they were outed. Makes no sense. Some Remington Ranger pulling the shots. There I've had my said my 2 cents.

In my first years in, mid 70's, I realized it was the most helpful, capable officers, who were RIFed.
Didn't understand why. Agree
After 10 years, I did.

Everything was for the dog and pony show.
The mission was the dog and pony show.

Did you know that Adm Nimitz grounded his destroyer early in career?

He was allowed that one mistake.

Great book called "The Admirals"

Now, even minor infractions end careers.
That's why they military is full of sycophants.

 

[Wxx3]

This is from today's WSJ.
It does point out a number of issues wer have discussed:

"REVIEW & OUTLOOK
A Missed Warning on the McCain?

A 2015 report highlights the stress on ships and crews based abroad.

By The Editorial Board | 619 words

The U.S. Navy has found and identified 10 sailors who died last month when a guided-missile destroyer crashed into a tanker in the Pacific, and one service member hadn’t reached his 21st birthday.

An investigation continues, though a 2015 report that received little attention compounds questions about whether the military has the resources to equip sailors for war.

The USS John S. McCain’s collision happened in a busy shipping lane near Singapore, and several theories have been offered. One is a cyber attack, though there is no obvious evidence so far.

A Chinese newspaper pounced to suggest that it’s unsafe for the Navy to operate in the area, and how convenient for Beijing’s purposes. The Navy has released few details but relieved the commander of the Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral Joseph Aucoin, who was scheduled to step down within weeks.

The McCain incident follows a fatal crash earlier this summer involving the USS Fitzgerald, which cost seven lives and the ship’s commanding and executive officers their posts.
A ship collided with a South Korean fishing boat in May.
The USS Antietam somehow ran aground in Tokyo Bay in January; the Navy fired the commanding officer in that incident, too.

The common denominator is the Pacific, and many ships in the Seventh Fleet region are “forward deployed.”

The McCain, Fitzgerald and Antietam are all home-ported in Japan. The question is how so many events could unfold in a year in one command, and a 2015 Government Accountability Office report now regrettably looks prescient.

The report describes how ships home-ported abroad have weathered particularly tough deterioration in recent years, while budgets have tightened and the size of the force has decreased.

The Navy relies on an overseas presence that allows ships to show up anywhere within days or even hours. This is great for deterrence. But this requires a rapid tempo of operations.

GAO found that ships home-ported in the U.S. spent 69 days a year deployed under way, on average, between 2004 and 2012.

Ships based overseas in places like Spain or Japan spent 111 days under way.

U.S.-based ships are supposed to spend about 40% of their 27-month cycle deployed or available, with the rest in maintenance or training.

Japan-based cruisers and destroyers, on the other hand, are slated to spend 67% of their two year cycle deployed or ready to go, and only 33% in maintenance.

The accruing deferred maintenance, the report notes, could shorten a ship’s life, even as the Navy has too few ships. Unlike U.S.-based ships, the planning cycle for ships based in Japan also does “not include a dedicated training period” that allows crews to hone their skills for competency at sea.

The quick turnarounds create what GAO calls a “train on the margins”approach. This means “crews train while under way”or sometimes in the few days in between.

It isn’t clear what the Navy has done since the report’s findings, and the point is not to blame the dysfunction entirely on the service.

Funding and priorities are dictated by 535 politicians in Congress. The military has been subject to erratic budgets that make building new ships or other large projects difficult and more costly.

Many of the politicians who complain about misspent money at the Pentagon have created a much more expensive mess. The armed forces have an honorable tradition of relieving top brass after a failure, and more government institutions could benefit from such accountability.

As for President Trump and Congress, perhaps this autumn they can take a break from feuding about a border wall—and pass a more stable appropriations bill to give American sailors the equipment and training they need for their crucial missions.■

 

[CDreamer]

I don't like the 67% deployment number, as I realize these ships need a ton of maintenance. But I also don't like the 19% deployment number for US based ships. (69 days deployed). That seems too low to provide proper training hours.
I guess it's so low here because being deployed costs more?
Anyway, we don't have a lot of true need for deployment off the West Coast, so it seems like the only answer is to swap out the entire fleets (e.g: US based ships go to Japan and vice versa) over the course of a year or two, in order to average out their maintenance time.
Maybe the Navy is already doing that?

BTW, I'm a hawk - although I don't like wastefulness. My uncle made a nice career as a civilian consultant hired to keep the various branches from reinventing every weapon, plane, vehicle, etc. from scratch. They always insisted that "their" need was special. Mostly he found that the leaders of the different branches simply wouldn't talk to each other so he spent a lot of time as a "mediator". One branch would insist they had to order a whole new weapon design when minor modification of an existing one from another branch would do the job fine along with a different paint scheme. (Sort of like the simple and common mod of putting Carrier landing gear on an Air Force fighter jet.)
To his credit he saved billions of dollars in waste over his career.

 

[AlaskaProf]

(Sort of like the simple and common mod of putting Carrier landing gear on an Air Force fighter jet.)

Can you cite an example of this "common mod" actually occurring?

The only examples I know of inter-service commonality, the McDonnell F4 and the LTV A7 were long-proven Navy designs later adopted by the AF.

 

[stubones99]

The real problem is that many of these contracts are cost plus contracts, so any savings you make end up costing the company more money. In my opinion, there should never EVER be a cost plus contract issued since it is a money pot that the military contractors love to wallow in. They always price something attractively to sell it, and then encounter bumps that require more money, and since they are making progress, the government almost always puts out the extra money.

Needless to say, I didn't fit well in that environment.

 

[Northern Spy]

I found this article interesting. Disclosure, I served with the author on a sub. Possibly, the most analytical person I've ever met.
https://m.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-08/collisions-did-culture-trump-technology

 

[Wxx3]

NS,
Great analysis, that seems to hit the nail on the head.
Thank you for sharing.

 

[HiDHo]

Capt Toti is right on with his submarine vs surface experiences.
The Surface Warfare qualifications are a check list, i was on active duty when that program first started. The engineering portion of the quals where dreaded by other ratings and officers. Damage Control and Fire Fighting quals also as 99% of those assigned those duties where from the engineering ratings with the exception that everyone was sent to fire fighting and damage control schools no matter your rating.
The tradition of Naval Officers being gentilemen and the crew a scurvy lot was still in practice. The best officers where always " mustangs".
Sounds to me like the special sea and anchor detail should be de-tuned down to the best lookouts, one search radar, sonar and the best helmsman who is allowed to tell the OOD a collision is emanate.

 

[psneeld]

I found this article interesting. Disclosure, I served with the author on a sub. Possibly, the most analytical person I've ever met.
https://m.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-08/collisions-did-culture-trump-technology

NS, smart guy......I saw many of the same cultural differences on USCG cutters versus USCG aviation.

I also saw things getting better in the USCG before I retired. Yet I fear the culure of perfection expected has its own issues, especially at low level SAR resources I interact with regularly.

Culture and training go hand in hand in the military.. I think it is something many who never experienced really dont understand.

 

[Blissboat]

All that Capt. Toti writes makes perfect sense. The different operating environments (between surface operations and submerged) are clear enough. The greater risks of operating a submarine (even when not submerged) should demand a more cautious culture. I've often thought sub driving resembles aviation, in that there are three dimensions of control, and that the consequences of casualty can be similarly unforgiving.

I wonder about differences in the process of qualifying to be a watchstanding officer. In a recent Proceedings article, a writer lamented the "hurry-up" culture of SWO watchstander qualifying, saying that C.O.s are under remorseless pressure to qualify junior officers. To embark a junior officer and then fail to quickly get him or her qualified leaves the watch contingent short handed. Failure to qualify can sidetrack and even permanently damage a Surface Warfare officer's career. And, for a skipper to report a junior as having failed to qualify can cast a shadow on the skipper's performance record, suggesting inattention to training or unrealistic expectations. That's the critical rap, anyway. Is it different in subs?

 

[psneeld]

"And, for a skipper to report a junior as having failed to qualify can cast a shadow on the skipper's performance record, ......"

And thus the culture, and the relieving of command of surface guys before the real facts are in.

In USCG aviation yrars past, you could crash a couple aircraft and as long as you werent the primary cause, it barely affected your career. The bigger picture was always looked at. Not so in the surface fleet. There were/are numerous differences how the 2 communities viewed certifications to awards and promotions to overall safety. Huge differences sometimes in culture.

While the USCG isnt the Navy, there are huge similarities, but definitely wide differences that come and go in cycles.

 

[Northern Spy]

Failure to qualify can sidetrack and even permanently damage a Surface Warfare officer's career. And, for a skipper to report a junior as having failed to qualify can cast a shadow on the skipper's performance record, suggesting inattention to training or unrealistic expectations. That's the critical rap, anyway. Is it different in subs?

I've been out for twenty years, so my take on this is likely outdated.

The consequences of the sword of Damocles for all bubbleheads was to be "****-canned to the surface fleet", whether it was for incompatibility or medical reasons. A straggler might get a few breaks in qualifying, but not many. Many who got medically disqualified, chose to get out rather than to go surface.

Qualifying in subs was not easy, but not arduous either. What Mr. Toti doesn't discuss is that the vetting process to get the chance to qualify subs ensures that the candidates are of a fairly high standard and are likely to succeed. The qualification process itself was transformational, but the consequences for failure were completely transactional.

The problem may be that the surface fleet doesn't have the same outlet for those that don't meet a prescribed standard, and just has to deal with the candidates they receive.

My last tour was on a tender that spent a lot of time working on surface ships, so I was somewhat exposed to the surface fleet. It is indeed a completely different experience.

 

[HiDHo]

HASC: Navy Is Treading Water
The House Armed Services Committee recently held a hearing to review the recent naval accidents. The discussion soon focused on the ongoing readiness issues the Navy faces, including reduced training, long deployments and continued budget uncertainty. The Navy acknowledged it had knowingly operated warships despite a growing number of major training and maintenance shortfalls - all done to meet increasing operational demands. The hearing provided an alarming picture of exhausted crews and commanders on a shrinking overseas fleet saddled with constant deployments.

The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) is also scheduled to have a hearing on Navy readiness issues related to the naval mishaps that claimed the lives of 17 sailors.

 

[stubones99]

I saw that the USN will be running AIS for the near term to prevent future accidents.

 

[Bigsfish]

True but the release said only in shipping lanes.

 

[MRRiley]

And the verdict is in.....

Sheer, unadulterated, idiocy.

Watchstanders Looking Wrong Way Before Fitzgerald Collision: Navy | Military.com

 

[catalinajack]

And the verdict is in.....

Sheer, unadulterated, idiocy.

Watchstanders Looking Wrong Way Before Fitzgerald Collision: Navy | Military.com

What I found very interesting was the fact that the boatswain's mate of the deck took command of the helm one minute before the collision. Apparently, this enlisted sailor was aware of the situation while the Officer of the Deck was fatally indecisive. For an enlisted sailor to take command of the bridge from an officer is extraordinary.

 

[Wxx3]

What I found very interesting was the fact that the boatswain's mate of the deck took command of the helm one minute before the collision. Apparently, this enlisted sailor was aware of the situation while the Officer of the Deck was fatally indecisive. For an enlisted sailor to take command of the bridge from an officer is extraordinary.

Sadly, he didn't did it soon enough.
But that's the good news, for a least it showed that someone on that boat had a clue.
The rest was just a CF

 

[kthoennes]

"...tried to get a radar track on the Crystal but were unsuccessful..." How in the world is that possible?

 

[Wxx3]

"...tried to get a radar track on the Crystal but were unsuccessful..." How in the world is that possible?

Well that is the definition of a CF.

But when you read the report, it's clear they had watch standers on the port side, but no one on the stbd side, though they had 3 ships on that side for over 30 minutes !

So it only gets more incredulous.

 

[ghost]

Crickets